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The "Purchase or Sale" Restriction of SEC Rule 1Ob-5-
Judicial Extension of a Federal Remedy
THOMAS E. PATTON*
The remedies provided to shareholders of public corporations by the federal
securities laws against inadequate disclosures and abusive or unfair practices in
the issuance and trading of securities are extensive and pervasive.1 For almost
35 years, investors have been afforded the protection of a comprehensive regu-
latory scheme by which Congress has declared that there shall be full and fair
disclosure in the initial issuance2 and in the subsequent trading3 of securities,
as well as in the dealings of investment companies as trustees of other people's
monies.4
The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 expressly
grant to shareholders the right to sue the issuing corporation and, in most
cases, "insiders" 5 and others such as underwriters6 and "experts," 7 for false or
misleading statements or material omissions contained in various registrations
* Associated with Sullivan & Cromwell, New York City. A.B., Catholic University of
America, 1962; LL.B., Catholic University of America, 1965; Member of the New York
and District of Columbia Bars. In the interests of full disclosure and in accordance
with the salutary policy of the Catholic University Law Review and of the American
Bar Association Journal, the author wishes to state that his firm handles pending Rule
10b-5 actions.
1. Among the important remedies expressly conferred are (1) suit against the issuer
and other participants in a securities distribution for false or misleading information
contained in a registration statement (Securities Act of 1933 § 11 (a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)
(1964)) ; (2) suit against an issuer, seller or participant in a securities distribution
for a false or misleading prospectus or oral communication (Section 12 of the 1933 Act,
15 U.S.C. § 771 (1964)) ; (3) suit against any registrant under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 for false or misleading statements made in reports and other documents
required to be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. §78r(a) (1964)).
2. Securities Act of 1933 §§ 1-26, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1964).
3. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 1-34, 201-11, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1964).
4. Investment Company Act of 1940 §§ 1-28, 30-53, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-52
(1964); Investment Advisors Act of 1940 §§ 201-21, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-I to 80b-21
(1964).
5. Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11(a)(1)-(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a)(1)-(2) (1964).
6. Id.§ l1(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. §77k(a)(5) (1964).
7. Id. § ll(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (4) (1964).
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and reports required by the two acts to be filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission.8 Congress confidently contemplated that these expressly granted
remedies would provide shareholders sufficient redress and would constitute
effective in terrorem proscriptions against unfair securities dealings.
In actuality, however, the most significant remedies by far now available to
shareholders are those created by judicial decisions granting implied relief un-
der those sections of the 1934 Act which do not expressly confer a right of ac-
tion. Thus, for example, following a long line of lower court decisions, the
Supreme Court sanctioned a shareholder's implied right to any appropriate
relief (including injunction and, in the case of the merger, possible dissolution)
against the issuer of false or misleading proxy statements under Section 14 of
the 1934 Act and SEC Rule 14a-9.9
Without question-as every lawyer having anything to do with corporations
or securities knows-one short subparagraph of one rule promulgated by the
SEC under one subsection of the 1934 Act has spawned more litigation and
more comment than all other shareholders' remedies combined-express or
implied.10 That rule, which goes by the handle of Rule lOb-5, 1' contains a broad
prohibition against any fraud, scheme, misrepresentation or unfair practice "in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security." So many articles, semi-
nars, tracts and tomes have been published about this rule that one is intimi-
dated at the thought of contributing any new or meaningful kindling to the fire.
This article seeks only to focus on the expanding judicial interpretation of one
aspect of Rule lOb-5, the requirement and limitation expressed in the rule that
the wrongdoing proscribed be "in connection with the purchase or sale" of a
security. Recent decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit have
vastly expanded the scope of the "in connection with" limitation to the point
where a corporate or individual defendant may now be held accountable for
8. See generally Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 Hsv. L.
REV. 1146 (1965); Ruder, Corporate Disclosures Required by the Federal Securities
Laws: The Codification Implications of Texas Gulf Sulphur, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 872
(1967).
9. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
10. For discussions of the implications of this development, both pro and con, see
3 L. Loss, SECURIriEs REOULATION 1445 (2d ed. 1961); Fleischer, Securities Trading
and Corporate Informatton Practices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur
Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REV. 1271 (1965); Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New
Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 383 (1964); Ruder, Civil Liability Under
Rule lOb-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent? 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 627 (1963);
Ruder, Pitfalls in the Development of A Federal Law of Corporations by Implication
through Rule lOb-5, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 185 (1966). As the Supreme Court stated very
recently in its first opinion concerning the rule, "§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 may well be
the most litigated provisions in the federal securities laws." SEC v. National Sec., Inc.,
393 U.S. 453, 465 (1969).
11. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964) ; 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1968).
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any misrepresentation, no matter how innocent, if the misrepresentation is
"calculated" to "influence" trading in securities, even though the defendant's
conduct is not accompanied by trading in the securities. 12 Thus, a corporation
may be liable to investors purchasing its stock if it issues a statement, such as a
press release or annual report, containing misrepresentations of material facts
which might influence investors' decisions. It is the submission of this article
that the virtual abolition by the Second Circuit of the requirement that a de-
fendant's conduct be "in connection with" his dealings in securities is unwar-
ranted, unfounded and unfortunate. The extension by judicial decision of the
implied remedy to a purchaser or seller of securities for any such corporate mis-
statement is far more than a mere "liberal" construction of Rule 10b-5 (which
construction cannot be quarrelled with in view of Congress' desire to promote
fair dealings in securities), but it is in effect a jurisdictional expansion into an
area not properly part of the federal jurisdiction granted to the courts-either
expressly or by implication-by Congress. The new "construction" of the "pur-
chase or sale" limitation is wrong for a variety of reasons: it is contrary to Con-
gressional intent and judicial precedent; it is unwise as a matter of policy be-
cause it is uncertain in application and its dimensions tend to tread upon areas
of management fiduciary duty and standards of prudent conduct heretofore
comprehended only by state laws; and, most importantly, it is at odds with the
express language of Rule 10b-5. 13
Introduction-The Regulatory Background
In 1933, the Congress created the first federal regulatory scheme for dealings in
public securities. The Securities Act of 1933 prohibits certain public corpora-
tions from issuing securities 14 unless a registration statement is in effect and filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission 15 disclosing all material aspects
of the new security and of the issuer's business and financial condition. 16 Al-
though the Securities Act was directed specifically toward informing the public
about a new issue of securities, Congress included in the Act, by Section 17, a
12. Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. granted, 37 U.S.L.W. 3315
(U. S. Jan. 2, 1969) (No. 894); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d
Cir. 1968). Certiorari was denied to two individual defendants, 37 U.S.L.W. 3395 (U.S.
Apr. 21, 1969). As to the corporate defendant, the "press release" issue which is the
subject of this article was remanded and no appeal has yet been taken.
13. A contrary view was espoused in Note, The Purchaser-Seller Limitation to SEC
Rule lOb-5, 53 CORNELL L. Q. 684, 687 (1968), which took the view that the "pur-
chase or sale" language does not lay down expressly a requirement that there be a pur-
chase or sale.
14. Except certain exempt securities and offerings, §§ 3-4, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77c-d (1964).
15. Until 1934, the federal agency responsible for administering the 1933 Act was
the Federal Trade Commission. The SEC was created in 1934 by the Exchange Act.
16. § 5, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 7 7 e (1964).
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general prohibition against fraud or misrepresentation by sellers of a security,17
whether or not the sale is pursuant to a registered offering.
A year later Congress passed the Securities Exchange Act, which contains a
comprehensive regulatory scheme for trading in issued securities listed on na-
tional securities exchanges and, to some extent, for securities traded over-the-
counter.18 Certain manipulative trading practices such as matched purchases
and sales creating false impressions of market activity are specifically out-
lawed, 19 and trading over exchanges is subjected to regulation by requirements
that the exchanges and the securities traded on exchanges be registered with
the SEC.20
In addition to specific provisions regulating securities practices, Congress
enacted the now-famous Section l0b of the 1934 Act,21 which gave the SEC
power to promulgate rules prohibiting any manipulative or deceptive device or
scheme in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, whether traded on
exchanges or over-the-counter. Section 10b was designed, in the words of the
principal administration advocate of the 1934 Act, to be a "catch-all" provision
to assure fair dealing in all securities trading practices not specifically dealt
with in other provisions of the Act.22 Congress thereby gave the SEC a mandate
not only to regulate market trading in certain specific ways, but to promulgate
regulations to prevent other unspecified wrongdoings in securities trading.23
Section 10b contained no self-operative provisions but merely provided the
authority under which the SEC could promulgate those prohibitions against
false or deceptive trading practices which the Commission deemed unlawful
within the general language of the Section.
Eight years after the enactment of the 1934 Act, the SEC promulgated
Rule lOb-5, which implemented Section 10b by language as broad, compre-
hensive, and general as the statute itself; the Rule providing:
17. Securities Act of 1933 § 17, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1964).
18. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 1-34, 201-11, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1964).
19. Id. § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1964).
20. Id. §§ 6, 12, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f, 1 (1964). The 1934 Act also required issuers of
securities registered on exchanges to file current periodic reports disclosing recent
business and financial activities, id. § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1964).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
22. Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934).
23. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1964), provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange ...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contraven-
tion of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as neces-
sary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
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It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.24
At its inception, Rule lOb-5 was designed merely to supplement Section 17 of
the 1933 Act by prohibiting fraudulent or misleading practices by purchasers of
securities as well as sellers, since Section 17 prohibited only misrepresentation
by sellers. The SEC in its public release explaining the new rule stated that the
purpose of the rule was mainly to close the loophole of Section 17.25
A proper comprehension of the scope and intent of Section 10b and Rule
lOb-5 requires that they be placed in their proper perspective vis-a-vis the over-
all purpose of the 1934 Act. That purpose was enunciated with unusual clarity
by Congress in Section 2 of the Act,26 which introduces the Act by stating the
necessity for federal regulation of "transactions in securities" because such
transactions "are affected with a national public interest." The letter and spirit
of the 1934 Act were thus instilled into its provisions by Congress' explicitly
stated purpose to regulate securities transactions.
Supplementary to the direct and specific regulation of trading by the 1934
Act, Congress passed Section 13,27 which requires corporations with securities
listed on national exchanges to file periodic reports with the SEC containing
current financial data and information about material business transactions. In
Section 18,28 Congress provided that any shareholder injured by reliance on
such reports may sue the corporation and its managers to recover his losses.
Section 18, however, provides a remedy only with respect to misstatements con-
tained in reports required to be filed with the Commission. It did not com-
24. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968).
25. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (1942). Pursuant to its rule-making
authority under Section 15(c) (1) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (1) (1964), the
Commission has also promulgated Rule 15cl-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-2 (1968), which
in similar language to Rule 101b-5 prohibits frauds by securities brokers and dealers. The
1934 Act did not expressly provide any remedy or right of action to shareholders for a
violation of Section 10b.
26. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1964).
27. Id. § 78m(a).
28. Id. § 78r.
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prehend any private remedy for general misstatements made in other connec-
tions to purchasers or sellers of securities. Not surprisingly, therefore, it was not
too long after the promulgation of Rule 1Ob-5 that shareholders began seeking
redress on the basis of an asserted implied right to relief under Rule 1Ob-5 for
alleged wrongs not covered by Section 18 of the 1934 Act or Section 17 of the
1933 Act.
The judicial Background-Development of the Implied Remedy
In 1946, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsyl-
vania held in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.29 that certain plaintiffs, who
sold securities to corporate insiders who did not reveal material facts which
may have influenced the plaintiffs in their decision to sell, had stated a federal
cause of action under Rule 10b-5. The court felt that a remedy under the rule
can be implied from Congress' intent to provide investor protection, and from
the general principle of tort law that the violation of a statute gives rise to a
legal remedy in favor of those intended to be protected.3 0
Few quarrelled with this decision, in large part because the action was
brought by sellers of securities against the buyers, and thus the plaintiffs would
have had no remedy under Section 17 of the 1933 Act, which protects only
purchasers. Many were skeptical of extending the implied right beyond the
Kardon situation, however, because they believed that purchasers were already
sufficiently protected by Section 17. But it soon became generally held that pur-
chasers could also seek relief under the rule.31
Following those initial breakthroughs into an uncharted new area, the
federal courts have grappled with many problems in seeking to define a correct
and appropriate scope for federal jurisdiction in private actions seeking re-
covery under the rule. The courts have been required, for example, to articulate
the boundaries between actions charging essentially corporate or insider mis-
management or waste, which are not in themselves cognizable federal claims,
and claims made for wrongdoing in securities transactions.3 2 The line is some-
times exceedingly difficult to draw, especially where claims are made against
directors by shareholders for wrongdoings which constitute breach of state law
29. 69 F. Supp. 512 (1946) (opinion of Kirkpatrick, J., on motion to dismiss); 73
F. Supp. 798 (decision on the merits) (E.D. Pa. 1947).
30. The court cited Section 286 of the Restatement of Torts, saying that "the
[implied] right is so fundamental . . . that where it is not expressly denied the inten-
tion to withhold it should appear very clearly and plainly." Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
31. Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
32. See List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
811 (1965); O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964).
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duty and also involve in some way a transaction in securities. 33 Other problems
of interpretation include whether the plaintiff must prove reliance on the de-
fendant's alleged misstatements;3 4 whether the plaintiff must allege and prove
that the defendant's conduct was fraudulent and intentional or merely negli-
gent;35 and whether a plaintiff must show a relationship of privity as purchaser
or seller with the defendant. 36
Most of these questions have gradually and generally been resolved in favor
of plaintiffs, particularly the question of privity, for it is now well settled that
the parties need not be in a direct or face-to-face relationship, and thus trans-
actions over exchanges during comparable time periods are clearly covered by
the ambit of Rule lOb-5. 37 Problems still remain in the area of the degree of
reliance which a private plaintiff must establish. The problem of innocent mis-
representation also still persists, although recently the Second Circuit in SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.38 decided that a defendant may be liable for good
faith misrepresentations to the extent that he failed unjustifiably to exercise
reasonable diligence.
The "Purchase or Sale" Limitation
Another significant problem to which this article is addressed is the connection
which must be shown between the alleged wrong and a securities transaction
between the plaintiff and defendant. Rule lOb-5 requires that the prohibited
conduct be "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." This
proviso is obviously a limitation on the scope and application of the rule, for it
restricts the rule's coverage to wrongs arising out of securities transactions. It is
a very important limitation because it prevents the rule from embracing any and
all forms of wrongful conduct of corporate directors and officers, traditionally
the subject of state laws requiring corporate fiduciaries to act reasonably and
responsibly. 39 Indeed, the "purchase or sale" limitation is an essential restriction
33. Puharich v. Borders Elec. Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 92,141 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) ; Kaminsky v. Abrams, 281 F. Supp. 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) ; Condon v. Richardson,
275 F. Supp. 943 (S.D. Ill. 1967).
34. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811
(1965) ; Britt v. Cyril Bath Co., 290 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
35. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) ; Ellis v. Carter, 291
F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961) ; Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951);
cf. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
36. Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Joseph v. Farns-
worth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd, 198 F.2d 882
(2d Cir. 1952) ; see Comment, Civil Liability Under Section lOB and Rule IOB-5: A Sug-
gestion for Replacing the Doctrine of Privity, 74 YALE L.J. 658 (1965).
37. See Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1964);
Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
38. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
39. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717 (McKinney 1963).
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upon the scope of the rule, for otherwise there would be serious question
whether the rule is a valid subject of federal regulation under the 1934 Act.
The unified and pervasive theme of the act is to regulate and to promote fair-
ness in transactions in securities.
The "purchase or sale" restriction is not, however, self-explanatory, and, as
with almost any statute or regulation, it requires judicial definition and refine-
ment. Many questions arise: Must both the plaintiff and the defendant be
respectively purchaser and seller or vice versa? If not, is the plaintiff required
to show that he at least purchased or sold securities in a transaction connected
with the defendant's conduct? Does the rule reach any conduct in which some
securities transaction is tangentially involved? What is a "purchase" and what
is a "sale?" Is a false inducement to retain shares to the plaintiff's detriment "in
connection with" a purchase or sale? May a shareholder's derivative action be
maintained under Rule lOb-5 for injury to a corporation? Are third persons
associated with a defendant in his securities dealings liable as if they had them-
selves purchased or sold?
The problems of interpretation of the "purchase or sale" restriction are almost
as varied in application as the numbers of fact situations which can arise. Many
corporate transactional activities involve securities transactions-mergers, tender
offers,40 redemptions, issuance of treasury shares, purchase of investment shares,
etc. All of these activities may give rise to actionable 10b-5 claims if the wrong
complained of is "in connection with" a purchase or sale of securities. All of
these problems have confronted the courts, and many variations will un-
doubtedly be considered in the future.41
The extent of the nexus or "connection" between the asserted misconduct and
the securities transaction involved is one of the unifying and recurring prob-
lems common to most lOb-5 cases confronting the courts. The problem came to
the courts early in the life of Rule IOb-5.
The Birnbaum Case
In Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.,42 shareholders of Newport Steel brought
a lOb-5 action against the president of the company, who was also its chairman
40. For the latest information on relief available in connection with allegedly mis-
leading tender offers, see Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., No.
1091 (2d Cir., Jan. 24, 1969).
41. It should be noted by way of caveat at this point that most decisions on the
scope of Rule lOb-5 are rendered in the form of opinions on defendants' motions to dis-
miss the complaint for failure to state a claim for relief, made pursuant to FED. R. CIv.
P. 12(b) (6). In such cases, the court must assume the truth of all allegations in the
complaint, and courts give plaintiffs the benefit of any doubt because of any factual
determinations.
42. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
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and controlling stockholder, and against other directors, alleging that the presi-
dent sold out his 40 percent stock interest at a large premium. The plaintiffs,
suing derivatively and individually, alleged that the premium was paid because
the interest sold represented a controlling interest. The purchaser, Wilport Steel,
subsequently did assume control of Newport. The plaintiffs claimed that this
conduct violated Rule 10b-5 because the individual directors had made certain
misrepresentations to shareholders about the inadvisability of Newport's merger
with another company, Follansbee, even though the Follansbee merger was
allegedly a highly desirable deal for Newport and its shareholders.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dis-
missal of the complaint, holding that the plaintiffs, as shareholders of Newport,
had not stated a cause of action under Rule 10b-5 because neither they nor their
corporation were purchasers or sellers of securities. The court held that the rule
required the alleged misconduct to be "in connection with" a purchase or sale
and that a plaintiff who did not buy or sell could not assert a claim for relief.
As to the scope of the rule the court concluded: "that section was directed solely
at that type of misrepresentation or fraudulent practice usually associated with
the sale or purchase of securities rather than at fraudulent mismanagement of
corporate affairs, and that Rule X-10B-5 extended protection only to the de-
frauded purchaser or seller."
43
The Plaintiff as Purchaser or Seller
The sole and specific question raised in Birnbaum was whether a plaintiff who
neither sold nor purchased could assert a private claim impliedly granted by
Rule 10b-5. The court's obvious conclusion was that he could not. Although the
court explained its result basically in terms of the unavailability of a federal
remedy against corporate mismanagement, the result is more easily and readily
justified. First, a private plaintiff who neither sold nor purchased securities
simply cannot show that he was damaged,44 and the absence of harm, in such
circumstances, can be equated with the absence of a cause of action. Second,
the limiting language-"in connection with the purchase or sale"-by its ex-
press terms requires that the plaintiff's damage be caused by his securities
trading.
Birnbaum is also significant for what it did not hold. The court did not
consider or decide anything at all about a defendant's connection with a pur-
43. Id. at 464.
44. One possible exception is a claim that the defendant wrongfully induced the
plaintiff to retain shares that the plaintiff otherwise would have sold. It has been held
that in this case the plaintiff has a basis for relief under the Rule, Stockwell v. Reynolds
& Co., 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). But see Greenstein v. Paul, 400 F.2d 580 (2d
Cir. 1968), which may not allow a lOb-5 claim in such circumstances.
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chase or sale. That issue was left wide open for later confrontation. Nor was
Birnbaum based upon a requirement of privity. Nothing was decided about
whether a plaintiff and defendant were required to be in a direct contractual
relationship. Some courts have failed in later cases to comprehend that Birn-
baum did not touch these points. Shortly after Birnbaum, the Second Circuit
itself decided a case upon a misapprehension of the basis of the Birnbaum
holding. In Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp.,4s the facts estab-
lished that the plaintiffs purchased shares on a national exchange some time
after the defendant directors sold their shares over the exchange, allegedly pur-
suant to intentionally false misrepresentations of financial condition. The court
affirmed a dismissal of the complaint on the authority of Birnbaum and on the
opinion below, which held that the parties were not in a necessary relationship
of "privity." But as Judge Frank said in dissent, Birnbaum "lacks relevance
here."' 46 In Farnsworth, both parties were purchasers or sellers of the same
security. Birnbaum alone thus did not stand as a bar to the claim. If "privity"
is to be a requirement for a lOb-5 claim, it is a doctrine that must be read into
the rule, for the "purchase or sale" limitation does not address itself to "privity."
Later cases have taken almost all the life out of Farnsworth, recognizing its
fundamental flaw.47 "Privity," if it means anything, is a doctrine requiring a
showing that the plaintiff was on the other side of a transaction with the de-
fendant involving the same securities. "Privity" would embrace the "purchase
or sale" limitation of necessity, but the converse would not obtain.
In most cases the courts have understood and followed the real Birnbaum,
and have done so in many different factual settings. It is clear, for example,
that a corporation's issuance of securities to a director or insider, if accom-
panied by misrepresentations or concealments, can give rise to a derivative
claim by a shareholder for injury to the corporation. Likewise, the exchange of
a company's shares for shares of another company has been held a purchase or
sale under Rule lOb-5. 48 It obviously matters not that the shareholder plaintiff
was not a purchaser or seller, for he is asserting the claim of his corporation,
which did the purchasing or selling. If there was injury to the corporation ac-
45. 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952) (per curiam), af'g 99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
46. Id. at 887.
47. See cases cited note 37 supra. But in General Time Corp. v. American Investors
Fund, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd on other grounds, 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969), where the plaintiff was clearly not a seller,
the court cited Birnbaum as enunciating a doctrine of privity falling into the same error
as the court in Farnsworth.
48. Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
977 (1967) ; Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961); Continental Tel. Corp. v. Lycoming Tel. Corp., CCH
FED. Sc. L. REP. 92,193 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Puharich v. Borders Elec. Co., CCH FED.
Sac. L. REP. g 92,141 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) ; H. L. Green Co. v. Childree, 185 F. Supp. 95
(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
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companied by deceit in connection with a securities transaction,49 the courts
may appropriately entertain federal jurisdiction because the shareholder is
asserting derivatively the right of the corporation.5"
With almost no exceptions, the federal courts since Birnbaum have adhered
to the rather plain mandate of the "purchase or sale" limitation and have held
that a private implied remedy is available only to a purchaser or seller. 51 Two
recent decisions of the Second Circuit created some confusion, however, as to
the continuing viability of Birnbaum. Some courts construed these holdings as
"expanding" or "eroding" Birnbaum. These decisions did neither, as the Sec-
ond Circuit shortly thereafter made clear; they merely construed the "pur-
chase or sale" limitation in unique factual circumstances.
In Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co.,5 2 a shareholder of Crown Finance had
refused to sell his shares to Beneficial in a tender offer, but he was forced in-
voluntarily to turn in his shares, after Beneficial had acquired a 95 percent
interest in Crown, pursuant to a statutory "short-form" or "freeze-out" merger.53
The complaint alleged that the merger was effectuated pursuant to a fraudulent
plan to prefer one class of Crown shareholders (directors holding "Class B"
shares) over another (Class "A" shareholders such as the plaintiff). The dis-
trict court agreed with the defendant's position that the plaintiff was not a pur-
chaser or seller as required by Birnbaum. The Second Circuit reversed, and de-
cided that an involuntary seller is just as much a "seller" as any other kind for
49. O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964).
50. In SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969), the Supreme Court held that
shareholders of a life insurance company "purchased" shares in another insurance
company when they exchanged their shares for the new ones. This decision was the
first opinion ever written by the Supreme Court under Rule lOb-5. The Court held that
insurance companies were not exempted from the rule by a federal law providing in
effect that states have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the insurance business. The
Court, per Mr. Justice Marshall, took pains to note that it was not deciding any ques-
tion about private remedies under the Rule since the case was brought by the Commis-
sion which of course can enforce the 1934 Act without being a purchaser or seller.
Id. at 467 n.9. However, the Court noted significantly that even the Commission is re-
quired to show that the challenged conduct was "in connection with the purchase or
sale," in order to establish a violation. Id. at 466.
51. E.g., Jensen v. Voyles, 393 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1968); Mutual Shares Corp. v.
Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967); Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378
F.2d 783 (8th Cir. 1967) ; General Time Corp. v. American Investors Fund, Inc., 283 F.
Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd, 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026
(1969) ; Ferraioli v. Cantor, 281 F. Supp. 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) ; Colonial Realty Corp.
v. Curtis Publ. Co., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 92,105 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Hoover v. Allen,
241 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); cf. SEC v. Electrogen Indus., Inc., CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 1 92,156 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
52. 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
53. Typically, such statutes provide that the directors of a corporation which owns 90
or 95 percent of a subsidiary may authorize the merger of the subsidiary into it without
seeking approval of the subsidiary's board or shareholders. See, e.g., DEL. GEN. CORP.
LAW § 253 (Supp. 1968) ; N.Y. Bus. CORp. LAW § 905 (McKinney 1963).
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the purposes of Rule lOb-5: "Since, in order to realize any value for his stock,
appellant must exchange the shares for money from appellee, as a practical
matter appellant must eventually become a party to a 'sale,' as that term has
always been used." 5 4 This result is clearly no departure from Birnbaum, and it
should not have come as a great surprise to anyone. Yet some courts believed
that Vine was a step beyond Birnbaum.
The second decision that proved unnecessarily troublesome was A.T. Brod &
Co. v. Perlow.55 The plaintiff, a brokerage house, sued a customer who allegedly
ordered the plaintiff to purchase shares for him with the fraudulent intent not
to pay for them unless the market went up. The plaintiff executed the order as
broker, or agent, and had to sell out at a loss when the defendant failed to pay.56
The district court held that the broker was not a "purchaser" because it acted
as agent and not as a principal or investor. The Second Circuit reversed what it
conceived to be an overly narrow application of the "purchase or sale" language
of Rule lOb-5.5 7 The court did not really expand or erode Birnbaum by this
result, as it is difficult to support a distinction between a purchase as agent and
a purchase as principal insofar as the "purchase or sale" limitation of Rule
10b-5 is concerned. No such distinction is drawn by the rule.5 8
Vine should be viewed as nothing more than an application of Birnbaum in
a peculiar situation; Brod may be criticized on some grounds, but it decided
nothing contrary to Birnbaum. Unfortunately, however, Vine and Brod have
been read by some courts as casting doubt on the viability of Birnbaum. In
Entel v. Allen,5 9 shareholders of an investment company (Atlas) sued the com-
pany and others for allegedly concealing in a proxy statement that Atlas' sale of
a large investment bloc of securities of Northeast Airlines was made to a com-
pany affiliated with Atlas by virtue of common control. The plaintiffs did not
allege that they purchased or sold, and they sued in their own behalves. Ini-
tially, the district court dismissed the complaint, correctly so under Birnbaum
54. Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 634 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
970 (1967). The same decision had been reached previously in Voege v. American
Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965).
55. 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967).
56. This common occurrence ought ordinarily to be viewed as a simple breach of
contract and not as a federally cognizable claim under Rule lOb-5. But, if the com-
plaint alleges a fraudulent intent by the customer at the inception of the transaction,
the court must assume the truth of the pleaded facts. Brod may be criticized as an un-
wise extension of federal jurisdiction, but not as wrong on its interpretation of the
"purchase or sale" requirement.
57. The court also, significantly, held that the fraud need not be in connection
with a representation as to the "investment value" of the security because Rule lOb-5
embraces any manipulative or deceptive device. See also Cooper v. North Jersey Trust
Co., 226 F. Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), which reached the same conclusion.
58. A similar result, relying on Brod, was reached in Allico Nat'l Corp. v. Amalga-
mated Meat Cutters, 397 F.2d 727 (7th Cir. 1968).
59. 270 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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because the claim was clearly not entertainable under Rule lOb-5 but was only
for a breach of fiduciary duties or, at most, a violation of SEC proxy rules.
However, the district court granted reargument six months later, during which
time Vine and Brod came down. The court reversed itself, holding that in light
of Vine and Brod the Second Circuit may no longer adhere to Birnbaum. The
district court incorrectly read the direction of the Second Circuit's opinions
and failed to recognize that within the boundaries staked out by Birnbaum
there is considerable room for movement. Entel, hopefully, will be treated as a
piece of flotsam on the waters of 1Ob-5 law.
A recurring problem under Birnbaum is whether Rule lOb-5 confers a right
of action on a shareholder who, though not selling, alleges that the insiders of a
company deliberately depressed the market price to induce him to sell. Prior to
Vine and Brod, the court in Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co.,60 held that if a plain-
tiff proves that he held onto his shares because of the defendant's false induce-
ments, and later sold at a loss, the "purchase or sale" requirement is satisfied.
Following Vine and Brod, the same court which decided Stockwell, in
another case, reached substantially the same conclusion on the ground that
Birnbaum had been modified by Vine and Brod. The decision may have been
correct, but the reasoning was wrong. The court aptly noted in Puharich v.
Borders Electronics Co. 61 that the defendants' alleged scheme to depress the
market price could only succeed by large scale selling. But the validity of this
reasoning is not affected one whit by the supposed "erosion" of Birnbaum by
Vine and Brod. The right of action recognized in cases where a plaintiff is
wrongfully induced not to sell might be viewed as some broadening of Birn-
baum, but at the most it is a minimal expansion of that doctrine into an area
where the plainti.ff must ultimately become a seller if he is to prove damage.
One further case is notable for its misunderstanding of the effect of Vine and
Brod. In Condon v. Richardson,62 a shareholder complained, inter alia, that the
directors of his company sold their bloc of shares to an affiliate at a premium.
63
Although the court nevertheless felt that Birnbaum stood untarnished insofar
as its particular fact situation was repeated and thereby dismissed the com-
plaint, it stated in the opinion that Birnbaum had been substantially overruled
by Vine and Brod.
The confusion and lingering doubts about Birnbaum were cleared up by the
Second Circuit, hopefully finally, in Greenstein v. Paul.64 In Greenstein, the
plaintiff was a shareholder of Sagamore, a corporation 80 percent owned by
60. 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
61. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. t 92,141 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
62. 275 F. Supp. 943 (S.D. Ill. 1967).
63. This was the precise claim made in Birnbaum.
64. 400 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1968).
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United Industrial. He alleged that Sagamore's directors and United Industrial
conspired to mulct Sagamore's assets into United for the purpose of depressing
the market price of Sagamore, all in order to force minority shareholders to sell
out. This case is thus remarkably similar in its facts to Puharich,65 where the
court asserted the questionable status of Birnbaum. But in Greenstein, the
Second Circuit affirmed a dismissal of the complaint and unequivocally re-
affirmed Birnbaum:
It has long been the rule in this circuit that to maintain an action
under § 10(b) of the Act and Rule lOb-5 of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission the plaintiff must have been a seller of the stock
involved [citing Birnbaum].
[u]nder existing law in this circuit the plaintiff is not a seller and
cannot invoke the civil remedy afforded by the Act and Rule. 66
Notably, the court stated that Vine does not hold to the contrary.67 Notably also,
Greenstein appears somewhat inconsistent with Stockwell and Puharich. The
only perceivable difference is that in Greenstein the plaintiff did not accept the
inducement to sell and instead held onto his shares. Greenstein affirmed a
principle that should never have been questioned. A plaintiff simply must show
that he was a purchaser or seller in order to have standing to seek relief under
Rule lOb-5. 68
The Defendant as Purchaser or Seller
By far a more perplexing problem arises where a claimed lOb-5 violation is
based on the conduct of a defendant which does not directly involve the de-
fendant's own purchase or sale of securities. Whereas it is readily understood
why a plaintiff in a private action must be a purchaser or seller, the question of
what connection a defendant must have with a purchase or sale is much more
complicated. To give a classic example: Is a director or officer who causes his
company to purchase shares from stockholders in another company liable to such
stockholders for misrepresentations made to them by the purchasing company?
Many troublesome questions arise. Is an independent certified public account-
ant who reports on a company's financial condition liable with the company
65. Puharich v. Borders Elec. Co., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. ff 92,141 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
66. Greenstein v. Paul, 400 F.2d 580, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1968).
67. The court also noted that if minority shareholders were ultimately frozen out
involuntarily they would have a claim under the holding in Vine. Ibid.
68. Perhaps the court's four-square and resounding reaffirmation of Birnbaum was
prompted in part by its broad expansion of Rule 10b-5 three weeks earlier in Texas Gulf.
Greenstein gave the court the chance to apply the brakes to its development of the
rule. Whatever the motive, Greenstein was indeed an explicit infusion of life into Birn-
baum.
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and its management for misleading financial information inducing a plaintiff
to purchase? Is a company liable for making any material misstatement about
its business which induces a plaintiff to purchase its shares?
Only a handful of cases confronted the dilemma prior to two definitive deci-
sions of the Second Circuit rendered in late 1968.69 One that did was New Park
Mining Co. v. Cranmer.70 A corporation, New Park, sued former officers and
directors alleging that the defendants, while in control of the company, caused
it to purchase stock in Lucky Mc Uranium, which purchase was said to be a
bad deal for New Park but a good deal for the defendants who got an emolu-
ment from Lucky Mc for their efforts. The defendants were themselves not pur-
chasers or sellers, but were associated closely with the seller, Lucky Mc, as well
as the purchaser New Park. The court held that the defendants were so inti-
mately connected with the seller that they were subject to liability as if they
themselves had sold:
A purchaser or seller of stock is not limited under Section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5 to an action against the other party to the purchase or
sale; he can sue a third person if in connection with the [plaintiff's]
purchase or sale that person defrauded him .... Were this not the
rule, corporate officers and directors would possess an immunity from
the consequences of their fraud under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
which outsiders who may have collaborated with them in defrauding
the corporation would not possess.71
New Park introduced the courts to the problem of a defendant's connection
with a purchase or sale in a limited way. The defendants were in effect on the
other side of the transaction from the purchaser, and they benefitted from the
transaction. The defendants were intimately associated with the sellers in the
securities transaction. The purpose and intent of the securities transaction was
to benefit the defendants at the expense of their corporation. In short, the de-
fendants' conduct was in connection with a particular purchase and sale. Dis-
regarding subtle analysis, it is clear that the defendants perpetrated a wrong
on their own corporation in connection with a securities transaction by which
they profited. It is difficult to dispute this decision.
Another early precedent was H.L. Green Co. v. Childree.7 2 The plaintiff
corporation had issued its shares in exchange for the shares of another corpora-
tion, allegedly in reliance on materially misleading financial statements of the
69. Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. granted, 37 U.S.L.W. 3315
(U.S. Jan. 2, 1969) (No. 894); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d
Cir. 1968).
70. 225 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
71. Id. at 266.
72. 185 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
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second corporation. The action was brought against the accountants of the
second corporation for their part in reporting on the financial statements. The
court determined with seemingly little difficulty that the accountants could be
liable for violating Rule lOb-5 if their conduct was in fact the kind proscribed
notwithstanding the absence of any purchase or sale by the defendants. 73
As more fully explained later, the holding in H.L. Green can be justified
without concluding that a defendant need never be a purchaser or seller. The
rule should be that a defendant's conduct must be in connection with a particu-
lar securities transaction-in H.L. Green it was an exchange of stock-and that
a defendant must be associated with the transaction in an intimate manner.
That is, someone connected with a defendant must be engaged in a securities
transaction which violates Rule lOb-5. Thus, a company which issues misleading
financial statements as in H.L. Green is a purchaser when it exchanges its stock
for that of the plaintiff corporation, and an auditor engaged by such company
may be intimately connected with the transaction. The line must be drawn in a
case where a defendant's conduct is not closely associated with someone who
purchases or sells from or to a plaintiff.
Perhaps the more significant question in such a case is whether the account-
ants can be sued under Rule 1Ob-5 unless knowing wrong is alleged and
established. A defendant such as an independent accountant cannot be put in
peril of such possibly substantial liability unless his conduct was intimately and
knowingly connected in purpose and design with a scheme violative of Rule
lOb-5.
Mooney v. Vitolo 74 draws the correct distinction. Shareholders of Bar Chris
sued that company and its insiders, alleging that false financial statements
induced the plaintiffs to purchase at inflated prices. Chief Judge Ryan held that
the plaintiffs had no 1Ob-5 claim because the defendants' conduct did not relate
in any way to any securities transactions with which they were associated. That
is, although the plaintiffs purchased on the basis of financial statements as-
sumed to be false, the defendants' issuance of the statements related in no way
to their securities transactions or transactions by those connected with defend-
ants. This is unlike H.L. Green, where an exchange of securities was effectuated.
Judge Ryan in his significant opinion said:
The statements made or acts done must have been in connection with
a specific offer or purchase and not just during the time that the stock
was on the market. The statute is clear; if it were otherwise then the
statute could have made unlawful any such fraudulent or manipula-
tive acts on behalf of a publicly owned corporation whose stock was
being traded, without any regard to any particular trade. The language
73. See also Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
74. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. % 92,116 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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of Section 10(b) does not provide for such liability.... In short, the
statute does not make actionable fraud in vacuo which causes stock to
rise or fall to the detriment of anyone owning it.7s
Mooney hit the nail on the head. There must be some person on the other side
of a plaintiff's purchase or sale whose wrongful conduct relates to a particular
purchase or sale of which such person is aware and associated with. Un-
fortunately, the Second Circuit later disagreed in Texas Gulf.
A relatively early precedent which encouraged the Second Circuit to dis-
agree with Mooney was Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A., Inc.76 The plaintiffs
alleged that they bought shares in Bargain City at a time when the company had
on file with the SEC certain allegedly false reports. This is all that was al-
leged; nothing was said in the complaint about any purpose or conduct by the
defendants relating to their securities transactions. The court held that at the
pleading stage it could not dismiss the claim because facts adduced at trial
might show a "connection" between the alleged wrong and the plaintiff's pur-
chase. With due respect, this decision is wrong because on a motion to dismiss,
the complaint itself must allege a sufficient "connection." Even assuming this
holding was right, however, it provides slim precedent for the later sweeping
opinions of the Second Circuit because the decision in Miller was based almost
solely on the court's peculiar concept of its role on a motion to dismiss.
Finally, the pre-Texas Gulf history is rounded out by Cooper v. North Jersey
Trust Co.7 7 The plaintiff borrowed money from a lender, Discount, pledging as
collateral certain securities. Discount discounted the loan with the Trust Com-
pany and re-pledged the securities to the Trust Company as collateral. The
Trust Company allegedly wrongfully sold the collateral to the plaintiff's loss.
The complaint alleged that the defendants originally made the loan pursuant to
a scheme to convert the stock. The defendants asserted that no misrepresenta-
tion was made in connection with a purchase or sale because the alleged fraud
did not relate to the value of the securities. The court sustained the complaint
against a motion to dismiss, stating that "the outlawed activity is not limited
to the portion of the transaction involving an exchange of consideration by the
purchaser for the stock."78
Cooper provides little help in analyzing the dimensions of the purchase or
sale limitation because the alleged fraud, ultimately, did relate to a sale made
by the defendants. At the time of SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,7 9 therefore,
75. Id. at 96,549-50.
76. 229 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1964). See also Freed v. Szabo Food Serv. Inc., CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 91,317 (N.D. I1. 1964).
77. 226 F. Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
78. Id. at 978.
79. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
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the question of a defendant's "connection" with a purchase or sale remained
relatively open and dimensionless.
Texas Gulf
The central and main issue in Texas Gulf was essentially unrelated to the "pur-
chase or sale" problem. The SEC's chief complaint was against "insider" offi-
cers and employees who purchased the company's stock (or accepted stock
options) on the basis of material undisclosed information about a very valuable
ore deposit discovered by the company. The information had not been disclosed
publicly, and the court held that insiders cannot trade if they know of such
material undisclosed information. Their duty, the court said, was either not to
trade or, if they wanted to trade, to disclose the information publicly.8 0 Presum-
ably, therefore, shareholders who sold during the time period when the insiders
purchased could maintain a 10b-5 position.
However, a second major issue, which is probably more significant overall,
was the so-called "press release" question, in which the Second Circuit, taking
advantage of the squarely raised question of a corporation's liability for making
misleading public statements not related in any way to any defendant's trading
activities, held that Rule lOb-5 was violated if the statement was made (1)
without the exercise of "due diligence" and (2) was "calculated" to "influence"
market activity.
The complex facts surrounding the press release issue, reduced to their basics,
are these: Between November 8, 1963 and April 10, 1964, Texas Gulf conducted
exploratory mineral drilling of a promising area of land in Ontario, Canada.
Early chemical assay results in December, 1963, indicated a very promising
copper and zinc deposit, possibly of very high content, but requiring further
drilling to establish the exact proven size of the strike. Test drilling was resumed
in earnest in late March, 1964, after the company had completed acquisition of
the land.
By the evening of April 10, geologists at the drill site were aware that the
strike was of likely large significance. Canadian newspapers were reporting
rumors of a major strike. On April 11, New York papers were reporting that
Texas Gulf had made the "biggest ore strike since gold was discovered." The
company's management took alarm at what they conceived to be exaggerated
and premature reports. Texas Gulf president, Stephens, asked a vice president,
Fogarty, to check on the situation, and Fogarty immediately consulted Mollison,
a vice president of mining engineering, who had just returned from the drill
site. Mollison reported the progress of the drills up through 7 p.m. of Friday,
80. Id. at 848. See also In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, CCH FED. SEc.
L. REP. 77,629 (1968) ; In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
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April 10. Mollison advised Fogarty that he did not believe the explorations
were sufficient to be conclusive as to the size and grade of the ore. He said he
had no further news as of Sunday morning, April 12. Mollison was dispatched
back to the site to continue drilling. Fogarty thereupon immediately drafted a
press release with the aid of a public relations consultant and with the counsel
of his lawyer. The release, dated 3 p.m., April 12, hit the press the next morn-
ing. It characterized the rumor as exaggerated, said that tests were not conclu-
sive, and that more drilling was necessary. Extensive drilling operations were
conducted through April 15, and on April 16 the company announced publicly
the existence of an extraordinarily large deposit of high grade ore. It was un-
disputed that the market reaction and market price of Texas Gulf stock between
April 13 and 16 were inconclusive to show the effect on the market of the April
12 release.
On the basis of these facts, the SEC charged that the April 12 release was
materially misleading and deceptive in violation of Rule 10b-5. The Commis-
sion sought an injunction against the corporation to prevent the issuance of any
further misleading information.8 ' The district court held that the release was
not misleading, and that even if it was misleading, it was not issued in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of any security.8 2 It was undisputed that (1) no
defendant traded on the basis of the April 12 press release, and (2) the purpose
of the press release was not to influence or manipulate the price of the com-
pany's stock.
The Second Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the corporation would violate
Rule 1Ob-5 if the press release were misleading and reasonably calculated to
cause investors to act in reliance on it, without any need whatsoever for finding
that the defendants either traded in Texas Gulf stock or issued the release for
the purpose of affecting the market. The press release issue was remanded to
the district court for further proceedings because the court of appeals said
that the record was inadequate to establish whether or not the release was mis-
leading or calculated to influence investors. If a finding were reached that the
release was misleading to a reasonable investor, the court said, the district
court must then determine whether its issuance resulted from a lack of due
diligence. If so, the court said that the district court in its discretion could
give the Commission its injunction.83
The key statements of the court in regard to the "purchase or sale" limitation
are of immense significance:
81. This injunction was sought pursuant to the SEC's statutory authority to obtain
injunctive relief against violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(e), 15
U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1964).
82. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
83. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 864 (2d Cir. 1968).
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We do not believe that Congress intended that the proscriptions of
the Act would not be violated unless the makers of a misleading state-
ment also participated in pertinent securities transactions in connec-
tion therewith, or unless it could be shown that the issuance of the
statement was motivated by a plan to benefit the corporation or them-
selves at the expense of a duped investing public.
*k * *
Congress intended to protect the investing public in connection with
their purchases or sales on Exchanges from being misled by mislead-
ing statements promulgated for or on behalf of corporations irrespec-
tive of whether the insiders contemporaneously trade in the securities
of that corporation and irrespective of whether the corporation or its
management have an ulterior purpose or purposes in making an offi-
cial public release.8 4
The consequences of this holding are, of course, readily perceived and perva-
sive. To hold a corporation liable for what Judge Friendly says may be a "slip
of the pen"85 is only part of the Texas Gulf dilemma, for, inasmuch as Rule
1 Ob-5 (2) prohibits both affirmative misstatements and omissions to state mate-
rial facts, must not any important corporate information be disclosed immedi-
ately? It would seem so, since Rule 1 Ob-5 (2) makes no distinction between mis-
statements and ommissions as far as imposing liability. Thus, was not Texas Gulf
obliged to disclose the facts of its first exploratory findings five months earlier,
in December, 1963, since the court of appeals held that the information avail-
able in December was material? ("Material" meaning, according to Texas Gulf,
"reasonably calculated to influence the investing public. '8 6) Yet the Second
Circuit, drawing a strange dichotomy, clearly held that the company was not
obliged in December-or at any other time-to disclose its material information
as long as no insider traded upon his knowledge of it.8 7 It seems, therefore, that
an affirmative misstatement unrelated to a defendant's trading activity is a viola-
tion of Rule 1Ob-5, whereas an omission to state a material fact is actionable
only if a defendant trades without disclosing the fact.
This incongruity is only one reason why the Texas Gulf decision on the press
84. Id. at 860-61.
85. Id. at 867. Judge Friendly concurred insofar as he felt the SEC could obtain an
injunction but stated that private relief against a negligent press release should not be
available. Judge Friendly stated that knowing misrepresentation was an essential ele-
ment of a private claim.
86. Id. at 862.
87. Id. at 848: "Thus, anyone in possession of material inside information must
either disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in order
to protect a corporate confidence . . . must abstain from trading . . . ." However, the
New York Stock Exchange recently issued a statement that a corporation must "re-
lease quickly to the public any news or information which might reasonably be ex-
pected to materially affect the market for securities." N.Y.S.E. COMPANY MANUAL
§ A2.
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release issue is wrong. The principal error was in the court's total misconception
of the purpose and scope of Rule 10b-5, a misconception which led to the
expansion of the applicability of the rule into areas not comprehended by the
rule or by the 1934 Act. Imposing liability on a corporation for nothing more
than a misstatement of fact is simply not within the federal jurisdiction confer-
red on the federal courts by the Exchange Act. A negligent misstatement, that
is, one made without exercising "due diligence" in ascertaining the true facts,
may well create tort liability arising from common law principles and the tort
of negligent misrepresentation. 88 But a federal remedy for such a wrong had
never before been seriously suggested.
The majority in Texas Gulf purported to find support for their construction of
the "purchase or sale" limitation in the legislative history behind the passage of
Section 10(b) in 1934. The reliance on Congressional reports was both mis-
placed and disingenuous. In the first place, the House Report cited by Judge
Waterman 9 related not to Section 10 but to the sections of the 1934 Act requir-
ing the filing with the SEC of periodic reports, such as Section 13,90 as to which
liability for false statements was expressly imposed in the Act in favor of inves-
tors losing money in reliance on the reports.
91
In the second place, the House Report relied upon by the majority explains
that the periodic reports were desirable disclosure devices to deter the "market
operator and the recreant corporate official who speculate on inside informa-
tion."'92 (Emphasis added.) In fact, the legislative history is replete with refer-
ences to "trading," "market manipulation" and "transactions." For example, a
Senate Report93 explaining proposals to control market activity, including
Section 10, said that the evil which was sought to be curbed was the "market
activities" of corporate insiders.
Although legislative history is not fully conclusive on the meaning of the
"purchase or sale" limitation, to the extent that legislative reports referred to it,
they always did so in the context of a desire to curtail certain "market activi-
ties." Indeed, the Act itself, in its structure and language, sets forth its own
purpose. It has already been noted that Section 2 announces rather clearly that
the Act is to regulate market activities. The genesis of Section 10(b) was in
the desire of Congress to supplement certain specifically outlawed trading prac-
tices, such as matched sales and purchases, wash sales, etc. 94 Section 10(b) was
passed in recognition by Congress that it could not be prescient enough to spe-
88. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS §§ 86, 88 (2d ed. 1955).
89. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934).
90. 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1964).
91. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1964).
92. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934).
93. S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934).
94. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 9, 10(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78j(a) (1964).
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cifically proscribe each and every manipulative trading device which might
be conceived; Congress knew that the new methods of deception might arise and
delegated to the SEC authority to prevent them. But it is patent that Congress
never intended to arrogate to federal jurisdiction any and all kinds of conduct
which, however innocent and bona fide, might influence the market. Surely
Congress never dreamed of making Section 10(b) a general regulatory pro-
vision to visit upon corporations which make misstatements in press releases.
The dissent of Judge Moore and Chief Judge Lumbard in Texas Gulf, which
is well worth reading as an enlightening statement of law and policy, demon-
ated the inaccuracy of the majority's reading of legislative history.95
Acknowledging that legislative history is too sparse to be determinative, the
next question is whether any other source provides an answer to the problem of
a defendant's connection with a purchase or sale. One answer, favoring the
Texas Gulf majority, is that a remedial statute such as the 1934 Act should be
broadly construed. This is a salutary rule of construction, yet it is no answer
because a remedial statute is designed to remedy a given evil, and even liberal
construction requires reference to the nature of the evil. Things not designed to
be remedied by a statute cannot (or at least should not) be brought within the
ambit of the statute by "liberal" construction.
The purpose and policy of the 1934 Act, and hence Section 10(b), can be
ascertained without resort to definitive comments of legislators. The policy which
veritably pervades the Act is obvious from the structure of the Act itself. If Con-
gress had wanted to gather in under federal jurisdiction all aspects of corporate
conduct and management, it obviously would have done so in terms much more
express. 96 The 1934 Act never purported to be a comprehensive federal corpora-
tion law. Within its sphere-the regulation of market trading-it is comprehen-
sive. But a judicial construction, such as the Texas Gulf holding on the press
release issue, which thrusts the federal courts into an area uncharted by the
federal statute, is an impermissible exercise of jurisdiction.
Texas Gulf's press release decision cannot be justified because Congress did
not confer jurisdiction on the federal courts to enjoin corporate action merely
because that action might have an effect on the market price of securities. Hope-
fully, therefore, courts in the future will not feel bound by all that the Texas
95. 401 F.2d 833, 870 (2d Cir. 1968).
96. In this regard we can agree with Professor Loss, who said in discussing the
judicial expansion of insider's liability under Section lOb-5: "It is a development that,
needless to say, I applaud. It was long overdue. But do we have to go on indefinitely
basing this whole revolutionary change on a section in the Exchange Act that says it
shall be unlawful for any person in the purchase or sale of any security to engage in
any act or practice that the S.E.C. prescribes as manipulative or deceptive? How big a
house of cards can we continue to build on that? This is backdoor jurisprudence with
a vengeance." Loss, History of S.E.C. Legislative Programs and Suggestions for a Code,
22 Bus. LAW. 795, 796 (1967).
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Gulf decision implies, recognizing that they have a responsibility-and the
power-to exercise only that jurisdiction which the 1934 Act conferred upon
them.
To the extent that federal courts follow Texas Gulf, they should at least
distinguish between an action commenced by the SEC and private actions.
Texas Gulf held that the SEC may obtain an injunction where a misstatement
violates Rule lOb-5 if the issuer was negligent in failing to exercise "due
diligence" to ascertain the true facts. Texas Gulf also said that a misstatement is
actionable only if it was objectively "calculated" to affect the market. This
rationale is essentially based on the principles of common law tort liability-i.e.,
forseeability and the conduct of a "reasonably prudent man."
In private actions, courts should be reluctant to impose money damages on a
corporation issuing a misleading statement unless they at least find that a de-
fendant foresaw an effect on the market and should have inquired further into
the facts behind his statement. If Rule 10b-5 is to create a federal law of torts in
respect of corporate misrepresentation, federal courts must tread lightly. Hind-
sight is no test for imposing such questionable liability. A very strict standard
of foreseeability should be applied.97
Heit v. Weitzen
If any doubt remained that the Second Circuit put to rest in Texas Gulf the re-
quirement that a defendant be directly involved in a securities transaction, that
court itself delivered the coup de grace to such doubts two months later in Heit
v. Weitzen.98 In Heit, the court held that shareholders could recover under Rule
10b-5 for losses incurred from their purchases of stock in reliance on the com-
pany's misleading financial statements. In ruling on whether the complaints99
stated a cause of action, the court said in words that could not be more under-
standable, that trading by a defendant is not necessary. The company involved
in Heit, Belock Instrument, allegedly included in its income statement for 1964
amounts representing overcharges to the government on contracts. The over-
charges allegedly resulted in a material overstatement of income. The court
assumed that the overcharges were concealed by the defendants for the purpose
of keeping the government in the dark about the true amounts due, and not in
any way to deceive purchasers of Belock's shares. Nevertheless, since the alleged
97. Judge Friendly, concurring in Texas Gulf, stated that the decision on the press
release issue should not necessarily be taken as a sanctioning of the right of private
plaintiffs to recover. 401 F.2d 833, 864 (2d Cir. 1968).
98. 402 F.2d 909, 913 (2d Cir. 1968).
99. The various complaints at issue below were consolidated on appeal.
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overstatement of income was objectively calculated to affect the market price of
Belock's shares, the court said that Rule lOb-5 offers a remedy to aggrieved pur-
chasers:
There is no necessity for contemporaneous trading in securities by in-
siders or by the corporation itself.
* * -*
It is reasonable to assume that investors may very well rely on the
material contained in false corporate financial statements which have
been disseminated in the market place, and in so relying may sub-
sequently purchase securities of the corporation. 100
Heit merely reaffirms the error of Texas Gulf, and it is not surprising that the
three-judge panel in Heit felt obliged to follow the en banc teaching of Texas
Gulf. However, Heit was a private action by shareholders, so that we now un-
fortunately have failed to heed Judge Friendly's admonition in Texas Gulf.
Subsequent to Texas Gulf and Heit, the opened floodgates ushered in numer-
ous district court opinions, allowing the maintenance of private actions against
defendants who had nothing to do with any purchase or sale,' 0' again not heed-
ing Judge Friendly's concurring caveat.
Thus the tale of the nontrading defendant is told. Salutary indeed is the
principle that a shareholder should have a remedy against recreant directors or
officers. Heretofore, such remedies have been fully available in actions in the
state courts, 10 2 and, in respect of fraudulent securities offerings or transactions,
in the federal courts. Now the line is blurred. The original purpose of the 1934
Act, to fill in the interstices by supplementing state remedies, stands rejected.
Conclusion
However beneficial was the policy of providing shareholders with remedies
against derelictions of corporate management, we have always understood
previously that such remedies were adequately provided for by state laws, under
which corporations were created and governed-except to the extent that fed-
eral law expressly afforded additional remedies because of peculiar national in-
100. Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 913 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. granted, 37 U.S.L.W.
3315 (U.S. Jan. 2, 1969) (No. 894).
101. E.g., Sprayregen v. Livingston Oil Co., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 92,272
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); Dienstag v. Bronsen, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 92,274 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); Drake v. Thor Power Tool Co., 282 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
102. Diamond v. Oreamuno, 29 App. Div. 2d 285, 287 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1968).
The New York court held that directors of a corporation must repay to the company
benefits realized from their trading in the corporation's stock on the basis of material
inside information. The state courts are, in general, thus attuned to all shareholders'
grievances, including Texas Gul/-type claims, just as much as are the federal courts.
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terests such as trading in securities on national exchanges. Now, we have built
up federal remedies by implication from federal law, and we have expanded
the remedies into almost every area of management's conduct. If management
is liable under federal law for any conduct affecting the market price of a com-
pany's stock, there is no perceivable end to the situations which might be
actionable under Rule 10b-5.
Because Rule lOb-5 never was intended to be assigned the function of a
general visitorial statute, recent cases, particularly Texas Gulf and Heit, which
headed us in that direction, exceed the federal jurisdiction conferred upon the
federal courts by Congress. We must at least recognize what has happened.
Court decisions on Rule 1Ob-5 have now progressed beyond mere liberal con-
struction. They have embarked upon a venture not tenable under the restrictions
which legislation imposed upon them.
There is one small but hopeful sign that the Supreme Court is aware of the
immense significance of Rule 10b-5 and of the need for federal courts to be
cautious about applying it to so many aspects of corporate conduct. On January
27, 1969, the Court construed the rule for the first time and held that insurance
companies are not exempt from its provisions. In doing so, the Court noted that
it was entering into a novel area and took pains to say that its decision was a
narrow one. "We enter this virgin territory cautiously" said Mr. Justice Mar-
shall for the six-judge majority. 1° 3 The Court expressly eschewed any effort to
resolve questions of private remedies under the rule. It is a safe prediction to
say that the Court would undoubtedly acknowledge the private right of action,
and it is to be hoped that the Court might back away from the broad applica-
tions of the rule adopted in Texas Gulf.
The story of the non-trading defendant is a remarkable example of the far-
flung consequences resulting from the promulgation by a federal agency of a
regulation under its rule-making power. It is undeniable that the promulgation
of Rule lOb-5 by the SEC in 1942 had consequences far beyond any dreamed
of at that time. It has created an enormous and comprehensive body of federal
law governing corporate and management conduct under such standards as
"due diligence" heretofore the province of state corporation law.
103. SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 465 (1969).
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